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CAN SOLDIERS BE PEACE OFFICERS? THE WACO DISASTER AND
THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT
by
DAVID B. KOPEL *
and
PAUL M. BLACKMAN **
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most significant trends of federal law enforcement in the last
fifteen years has been its militarization. The logical, perhaps inevitable, conse-
quence of that militarization was seen in the disaster at Waco, Texas, resulting in
the deaths of four federal agents, and seventy-six other men, women, and chil-
dren. In this article, we use the Waco tragedy as a starting point to examine the
militarization of federal law enforcement, and similar trends at the state and local
level.
Part Two of this article sets forth the details and rationale of the Posse
Comitatus Act--the 1878 law forbidding use of the military in law enforcement.
Part Three explicates how that Act was eroded by the drug war in the 1980s. The
article then discusses how the drug exception to the Posse Comitatus Act was used
to procure major military support for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms (BATF) raid against the Branch Davidians-even though there was no
real drug evidence against them-and how the drug exceptions to the Posse
Comitatus Act have made such abuses endemic.
Part Four examines the fifty-one day FBI siege of the Branch Davidian
residence, with a focus on the destructive role played by the FBI's Hostage
Rescue Team, an essentially military force which has proved counterproductive in
a civilian law enforcement context.
* Research Director, Independence Institute. B.A., Brown University; J.D., University of
Michigan. This article is based on, but revised from, a chapter of the authors' book No MORE
WACOS: WHAT'S WRONG WITH FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND HOW TO FIX IT
(Prometheus Books, 1997). The Independence Institute world-wide web site, at
<http://i2i.org> includes a Waco page offering a wide variety of Waco resources.
** Research Coordinator, National Rifle Association. B.A., University of California at
Riverside; Ph.D., University of Virginia. The views expressed in this article are the authors'
alone, and do not necessarily reflect the position of any organization, including the National
Rifle Association or the Independence Institute.
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In Part Five we look at the problem of groupthink, its role in the Waco
tragedy, and the importance of keeping groupthink-prone institutions-like the
military-out of law enforcement.
Finally, Part Six offers a broader view of the problem of the militarization
of federal law enforcement. We examine the proliferation of federal paramilitary
units and federal efforts to promote the militarization of state and local law
enforcement. After explaining the direct connection between the drug "war" and
law enforcement militarization, we propose numerous statutory remedies to de-
militarize law enforcement.
1I. THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT
The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 was passed to outlaw the use of feder-
al troops for civilian law enforcement.' The law made it a felony to willfully use
"any part of the Army ...to execute the laws" except where expressly authorized by
the Constitution or by act of Congress. The Act of 1878, as amended, provides:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully
uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus
or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.'
The idea was that law enforcement and the military are completely dif-
ferent, with the Army geared toward destroying enemies of a different nationali-
ty, while law enforcement must serve persons largely friendly, who are guaranteed
presumptions of innocence and rights not appropriate when dealing with an
enemy during times of war. Anything which made law enforcement seem milita-
rized was un-American; our citizens are not supposed to perceive themselves as
subjects of an occupying force.'
1. See generally, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1994); Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging
"Drug Exception'to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889 (1987); Kurt Schlichter, Note,
Locked and Loaded: Taking Aim at the Growing Use of the American Military in Civilian Law
Enforcement Operations, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1291 (1993).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1997).
3. "[Olur Founding Fathers intended this separation of the civilians and the military. They
did not want the military dominant, as it was in Europe and so the separation, the civilian con-
trol of the military became one of our tenets in the United States. And the Posse Comitatus Act
is really a logical follow on to that." Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward
the Branch Davidians: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. on the
Judiciary and the Subcomm. on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice
of the Comm. on Government Reform and Oversight, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., part 1, at 366
(1995)[hereinafter Joint Hearings] (testimony of Brig. Gen. Michael Huffman).
[VOL. 30:4
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As one modem court stated, the Posse Comitatus Act "is not an anachro-
nistic relic of an historical period the experience of which is irrelevant to the pre-
sent. It is not improper to regard it, as it is said to have been regarded in 1878 by
the Democrats who sponsored it, as expressing 'the inherited antipathy of the
American to the use of troops for civil purposes."' Indeed, during the debate over
ratification of the Constitution, The Federalist assured Americans that the military
would never be used against the American people.'
In Laird v. Tatum, Chief Justice Warren Burger referred to:
[A] traditional and strong resistance of Americans to any military
intrusion into civilian affairs. That tradition has deep roots in our his-
tory and found early expression, for example, in the Third
Amendment's explicit prohibition against quartering soldiers in pri-
vate homes without consent and in the constitutional provisions for
civilian control of the military.'
As another court put it:
Civilian rule is basic to our system of government. The use of
military forces to seize civilians can expose civilian government
to the threat of military rule and the suspension of constitution-
al liberties. On a lesser scale, military enforcement of the civil
law leaves the protection of vital Fourth and Fifth Amendment
rights in the hands of persons who are not trained to uphold these
rights. It may also chill the exercise of fundamental rights, such
as the rights to speak freely and to vote, and create the atmosphere
of fear and hostility which exists in territories occupied by enemy
forces.'
4. Wrynn v. United States, 200 F Supp. 457, 465 (E.D.N.Y 1961).
5. If the federal government can command the aid of the militia in those emergencies
which call for the military arm in support of the civil magistrate, it can the better
dispense with the employment of a different kind of force. If it cannot avail itself
of the former, it will be obliged to recur to the latter. To render an army unneces-
sary will be a more certain method of preventing its existence than a thousand pro-
hibitions upon paper.
THE FEDERALIST No. 29 (Alexander Hamilton).
6. 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). The case grew out of the U.S. Army's program of spying on anti-
Vietnam War political activists in the United States. Id. at 2. A five-to-four majority of the
Court refused to allow lower federal courts to hear the plaintiffs' complaints that the surveil-
lance program violated their First Amendment rights. Id. at 1. The Court majority held that use
of the military within the United States against American citizens was "nonjusticiable" and
within the sole discretion of the Executive branch. Id. at 15. The four dissenters argued that the
majority holding is an abdication of judicial responsibility to enforce the Constitution. Id. at
20, 28 (Douglas, I., dissenting).
7. Bissonette v. Haig, 776 F. 2d 1384, 1387 (8th Cir. 1985), aff'd on reh'g, 788 F.2d 812
1997]
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Use of the military in domestic law enforcement has repeatedly led to dis-
aster. In 1899, the army was used to break up a miners' strike at Couer d'Alene,
Idaho. Military forces arrested all adult males in the area, imprisoned men for
weeks or months without charges, and kept the area under martial law for two
years. During and after World War I, the army broke peaceful labor strikes, spied
on union organizers and peaceful critics of the war, and responded to race riots by
rounding up black "Bolshevik agitators."9 Historian Jerry M. Cooper observes
that the army's efforts "substantially slowed unionization for a decade."'' One of
the most egregious abuses of executive power in American history - President
Truman's illegal seizure of the steel mills - was carried out by the military,
which obeyed a plainly unconstitutional order." During the Vietnam War, military
intelligence was again deployed against domestic dissidents. "Military investiga-
tion of civilian protest activity was precisely the kind of abuse of standing armies
that eighteenth-century antimilitarists had feared."'" The 1970 killings of student
protesters at Kent State University were, of course, carried out by a National
Guard unit.
One of the reasons for the disastrous February 28, 1993, BATF raid on
the Branch Davidians and April 19, 1993, FBI tank attack on the same group was
that they were both run as military exercises, planned and executed with the
advice of the U.S. Department of Defense. As Rep. John Conyers later pointed
out, "The root cause of this problem was that it was considered a military opera-
tion, and it wasn't."'3 Attorney General Janet Reno, on the other hand, discussed
the incident, and the President's involvement, as similar to her acting as a gener-
al during World War II, with the President not expected to exercise constant over-
(8th Cir. 1986), affd, 485 U.S. 264 (1988).
8. Jerry M. Cooper, Federal Military Intervention in Domestic Disorders, in THE
UNITED STATES MILITARY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1989,
at 123, 135 (in Richard H. Kohn ed., 1991).
9. Id. at 136-37.
10. Id. at 137.
11. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952):
Even though 'theater of war' be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithful-
ness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private prop-
erty in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for
the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities.
Id. at 587. "[O]ur history and tradition rebel at the thought that the grant of military power
carries with it authority over civilian affairs." Id. at 632 (Douglas, J., concurring).
12. Cooper, supra note 8, at 141.
13. Events Surrounding the Branch Davidian Cult Standoff in Waco, Texas: Hearing
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1993) [hereinafter
Hearing].
[VOL. 30:4
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sight. 4 She acknowledged that the April 19 implementation of the "Plan B" tank
and chemical warfare assault on the Branch Davidians meant that "in effect [the
U.S. Army] Delta Force's recommendation was carried out."'"
As evinced at Waco, there are several loopholes in the Posse Comitatus
Act. For one, the prohibition on the use of military personnel and equipment does
not mean personnel cannot be used to assist law enforcement, only that they can-
not be used directly. 6 Thus, throughout the Waco standoff, military personnel had
express legal authority"7 to train FBI and other law enforcement officials to use
military vehicles.'" In addition, the proscription on use of the military is limited
to personnel; military equipment can be used, 9 although the usual procedure is to
remove or cover military markings. The civilian agency must pay the military for
use of the equipment."
III. THE DRUG WAR LOOPHOLE
The exceptions mentioned above are minor in comparison to the largest
loophole in the Posse Comitatus Act: the "drug law" exception. Normally, the
14. Id. at 40.
15. Id. at 65.
16. See 10 U.S.C. § 375 (1997), which provides:
The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary
to ensure that any activity (including the provision of any equipment or facility
or the assignment or detail of any personnel) under this chapter does not include
or permit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or
Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless partic-
ipation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law.
Id.
17. See 10 U.S.C. § 373 (1997), which provides:
The Secretary of Defense may, in accordance with other applicable law, make
Department of Defense personnel available (1) to train Federal, State, and local
civilian law enforcement officials in the operation and maintenance of equip-
ment, including equipment made available under section 372 of this title; and (2)
to provide such law enforcement officials with expert advice relevant to the pur-
poses of this chapter.
Id.
18. In the course of the siege, an FBI negotiator denied to Davidian Steve Schneider that
the military was involved, but acknowledged that the military had trained FBI agents to drive
tanks. Schneider indicated that he thought that was an erosion of the Constitution. Transcripts
of BATF Tapes of the Negotiations between Federal Law Enforcement and the Branch
Davidians, Feb. 28-Apr. 19, 1993 [hereinafter Negot. Tapes], no. 103, at 41-42 (Mar. 10, 1993).
19. See 10 U.S.C. § 372 (1997).
20. See 10 U.S.C. § 377 (1997).
1997]
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obligation to reimburse the military for the loan of equipment is a powerful incen-
tive not to use military equipment in domestic law enforcement. A police chief
will be hesitant to borrow military helicopters if his department will have to pay
for them. However, when drug laws are involved, the military assistance is free
and greater use of military personnel is allowed." As if to make the "drug war" a
literal war, the U.S. military has created special Joint Task Forces (JTF) whose
primary mission is to assist civilian drug law enforcement agencies.22 Some JTF
leaders foresee that not-far-distant day when restrictions against use of the mili-
tary in domestic law enforcement will be abolished completely."
A. The Drug Claims as a Pretext for Federal Intervention at Waco
As part of the planning for the Waco raid, BATF went to the Joint Task
Force Six (JTF-6), which covers Texas, and asked for training, medical, commu-
nications, and other support. The JTF-6 staff explained that they could only be
involved if the case were a drug case.21 If the case were not a drug case, BATF
could obtain assistance from other parts of the military, but would have to pay for it.
21. See 10 U.S.C. § 374 (1997).
22. It is not entirely clear that BATF has the authority to request military assistance under
the drug-law exception to the Posse Comitatus Act. The exception requires a "request from the
head of a Federal law enforcement agency," defined as "an agency with jurisdiction to enforce"
a variety of federal laws, none of which falls within the generally recognized jurisdiction of
BATE 10 U.S.C. § 374(b)(1) & (b)(4)(A) (1997).
The House joint committees investigating Waco, though, believed that BATF is authorized
as a DLEA ("drug law enforcement agency") by virtue of its investigations of "narcotics traf-
fickers who use firearms and explosives as tools of their trade, especially violent gangs."
Investigation Into the Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch
Davidians Before the House Comm. on Gov't Reform and Oversight in Conjunction with the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d,. Sess., 35 n.177 (1996) [hereinafter Committee
Report].
23. See, e.g., Jim McGee, Military Seeks Balance in Delicate Mission, WASH. POST, Nov.
29, 1996 (detailing the expansion of military involvement in the "drug war" and the desires of
some political leaders to expand the military's role in such missions).
24. Joint Hearings, supra note 3, part 1, at 400. Maj. Gen. John M. Pickler: "If it were not
for some kind of drug connection, we would not have been participants...." Id. Rep. Bill
McCollum: "But this particular unit was not, under the rules of the Army or DOD [Department
of Defense], permitted to give training to anybody that did not have a drug support connection
like this; is that right?...If it had not been for the drug support, your particular unit would not
have been permitted to train them?" Id. Gen. Pickier: 'That is correct, sir." Id. Witnesses rep-
resenting the Defense Department who emphasized in testimony that no active-duty military
personnel were present or participants in the BATF raid on February 28, 1993 included. Asst.
Defense Sec. H. Allen Holmes, Gens. John M. Pickler and Walter B. Huffman, Lt. Col. Philip
Lindley, Maj. Mark Petree, Sgt. Steve Fitts, Sgt. Robert W. Moreland, and Chris Grain, U.S.
Army Special Operations Command (Fort Bragg, N.C.). Id. at 345-4 10.
[VOL. 30:4
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Immediately thereafter, BATF asserted that the Waco case was a drug
investigation; Branch Davidian prophet David Koresh was supposedly running a
methamphetamine laboratory.25 The military should have known that the drug
claim was merely a guise; BATF came up with the allegation only after being told
of the benefits of such an allegation. In addition, the military prepared a memo-
randum for BATF on methamphetamine labs, and the precautions essential for
dealing with such a lab.26 However, when the paper was presented to BATF
agents, they openly ignored the information in front of the soldiers who prepared
it.2" Further, agents from the civilian Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) who were
assisting BATF also expressed no concerns about how BATF was addressing the
risks of a meth lab in its operational planning, which similarly should have indi-
cated to the military that the allegation was a mere pretext. 8
With this knowledge, JTF-6 signed onto the mission of "training a
National Level Response Team [BATF strike-force] for Counter Drug opera-
tions," in "Support of BATF Takedown of Meth Lab. '29 According to documents
received from the U.S. Special Operations Command under Freedom of
Information Act requests, the Joint Training operation (JT002-93) was approved
due to a request from BATF dated February 2, 1993, requesting U.S. and Texas
National Guard assistance in serving a federal search warrant "to a dangerous
extremist organization believed to be producing methamphetamine." 3 The Army
assistance at Waco would supposedly be "in direct support of interdiction activi-
ties along the southwest border." 31 (Notwithstanding the fact that Waco is approx-
imately 300 miles from the southwest border. Moreover, the original claim was
that Koresh was manufacturing methamphetamine, not that he was importing it
from Mexico.)
25. U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TABACCO, AND FIREARMS
INVESTIGATION OF VERNON WAYNE HOWELL ALSO KNOWN AS DAVID KORESH 212 (1993)
[hereinafter TREASURY REPORT].
26. See Committee Report, supra note 22, at 41.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 41-42.
29. FRAGO "E" OPORDER, Feb. 14, 1993; Memorandum for Record by Lt. Col. Douglas
C. Andrews, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, (no date, most of text redacted, on file with the
Akron Law Review). At the raid itself, in addition to BATF personnel, there were representa-
tives from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and one agent from the Drug
Enforcement Administration. Hearing, supra note 13, at 164.
30. Maj. Gen. John M. Pickler testified that the request for military assistance came from
both the Houston office and the Washington headquarters of BATF. Joint Hearings, supra note
3, part 1, at 360.
31. The briefing of the Texas National Guard was to William R. Enney, Interagency
Coordinator, Counterdrug Support. Hearing, supra note 13, at 164.
19971
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Had BATF actually been planning to take down a methamphetamine lab,
its plans would have been far different. Testimony at the 1995 congressional hear-
ings indicated the potential dangers of an explosion if a meth lab is not taken
down properly. For instance, because a stray bullet could cause a major explo-
sion, a "dynamic entry" (a violent break-in, the BATF's method of "serving" the
Waco search warrant) would be an extremely risky, disfavored approach." In
addition, the chemicals involved in methamphetamine production are toxic, capa-
ble of injuring lungs, skin, liver, kidneys, the central nervous system, and poten-
tially causing genetic damage.
DEA protocol for seizure of meth labs requires that agents wear special
clothing and bring other specialized equipment. BATF not only made no such
plans, but made express advance plans to use flashbang grenades - grenades
which could set off a massive explosion in a real meth lab.33 When requesting
flashbangs for use in the raid, BATF omitted mention of any possible presence of
a meth lab. Had BATF really thought there were a drug lab at Mount Cannel,
BATF should have taken advantage of the DEA offer of assistance by a DEA
32. See Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 400. Rep. John Shadegg (R-Ariz.):
Did the ATF ever, to your knowledge, express any concern about the
dangers that were presented by a methamphetamine lab?
Sgt. Fitts: Not to my knowledge, no, sir.
Rep. Shadegg: ...and the dangers that were exposed as a result of a lab
being there?
Sgt. Fitts: No, sir. Nothing in the inconduct would indicate that.
Rep. Ed Bryant (R-Tenn.): ...I understand you were assigned to draft a
plan under the contingency that ...there was a methamphetamine lab in there
and what should occur in case there was an accident.
Sgt. Fitts: My planning for the ATF did not include a methamphetamine
lab.
Rep. Bryant: ...there is a higher risk of danger, is there not, to ...using a
dynamic entry into a facility that has a methamphetamine laboratory in it?
Sgt. Fritts: Yes, sir.
Rep. Bryant: And the risks...if there were a bullet shot into it...cause of it
to explode, it could be a danger especially to children, to older people, to
people around it?
Sgt. Fitts: I think there would be a danger to all people, regardless of age.
Id. Similar testimony was provided by John Coonce of the Drug Enforcement Agency. Id. at
311-12. BATF's response was, "[W]e had a DEA lab team supervisor on board in the com-
mand post. His lab team was standing by for a call in case we did find...a lab, so that they could
take over that very sensitive area of making that area safe, while we began our search of the
premises." Id. at 447 (testimony of Phillip Chojnacki, the supervisor of the assault on Mount
Carmel Center). Such an invitation to the DEA would have followed the arrest expected to
involve a shootout.
33. Committee Report, supra note 22, at 44.
[VOL. 30:4
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Clandestine Certified Laboratory Team. But the offer was rejected.'
When JTF-6 was not looking, BATF did not even bother to pretend that
drugs were involved. Notably, the initial warrant application included nothing
regarding drug law violations - even though the presence of a drug lab would
have given BATF clear legal authority to search for the presence of any type of
firearm (not just machine guns and explosives, which were the target of the search
warrant), and even though the warrant affidavit threw in all sorts of other unsub-
stantiated allegations about Koresh.35 After the February 28, 1993, BATF raid was
repulsed, BATF sought and obtained a second warrant expanding the authorized
scope of the search of Mount Carmel. Even the second warrant application did not
include allegations of illegal drug activity.
Yet even after the botched raid, BATF still tried to use the drug claim to
receive free military support. Richard L. Garner, Chief, BATF Special Operations
Division, wrote to the Pentagon on February 28, 1993, asking for additional assis-
tance related to "an on-going investigation in Waco, Texas involving apparent
drug and firearms violations." 36Although BATT maintained the pretense into late
March, the Army was slowly recognizing the obvious. As of late March, 7 the
Army had come to believe that its assistance to BATF and the FBI would be reim-
bursed38 as is required when there is no drug nexus. By May 15, 1993, the mili-
tary suspected the possibility that "drug-connection was overstated to secure cost-
free SOF training and assistance. No mention of drugs in public media."39
34. Id. at 45.
35. Even if the drug allegations had been sincere, they would have provided no justifica-
tion for conducting a "no-knock" raid to prevent the destruction of evidence. It is rather diffi-
cult to flush a methamphetamine lab down the toilet, and the Branch Davidians did not have
flush toilets. See David G. Bromley and Edward D. Silver, The Davidian Tradition: From
Patronal Clan to Prophetic Movement, in ARMAGEDDON IN WACO: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON THE BRANCH DAVIDIAN CONFLICT 43, 55 (Stuart A. Wright ed., 1995).
36. Letter from Richard L. Garner, Chief, Special Operations Division, BATF, to
Headquarters, Department of the Army (Feb. 28, 1993) (on file with the Akron Law Review).
37. James L. Pate, Waco's Defective Warrants: No Probable Cause For Raid on Ranch
Apocalypse, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE, Aug. 1993, at 46, 48. Pate's Waco series was given the
Mencken Award by the Free Press Association "in recognition of his investigative articles
about the Waco massacre for Soldier of Fortune." The Award is established for "outstanding
journalism in support of liberty as chosen by their professional peers."
38. Approval of Request for Helicopter Support to the FBI and Bradley Fighting Vehicle
Support to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) by Lt. Col. Paul G.
Marksteiner, (Feb.28, 1993); Memorandum for Record, for the Acting Assistant Secretary of
the Army Michael W. Owen by Major Alexander S. Wells (March 25, 1993) (on file with the
Akron Law Review).
39. From the mass of documents the Treasury Department eventually provided to the sub-
committees investigating Waco, Rep. John Shadegg read into the record from an unsourced
document with a stamp marked "A00010228": "The use of the National Guard was a
1997]
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The drug enforcement exception to the Posse Comitatus Act has been
very effective at undermining the honesty of law enforcement personnel, who are
encouraged to allege a drug nexus in many investigations for the purpose of get-
ting, gratis, federal military assistance.' The U.S. Marshals Service claimed a
possible drug problem involved with the Randy Weaver family at Ruby Ridge,
Idaho in order to get military reconnaissance flights over the cabin, which
revealed no evidence of drugs.4'
According to an anonymous JTF-6 employee, JTF is often aware that
civilian agencies are fabricating a pretext for military involvement, but, "the JTF
doesn't even care, because there is little or no oversight involved. There's no inde-
pendent authority looking over anyone's shoulder."42
What was the basis for the claim that David Koresh was running a drug
lab? First, one person associated with the Branch Davidians had been convicted
of using drugs, and was paroled to McLennan County (Waco), Texas.43 Second,
ten Branch Davidians had been arrested or investigated for some "drug activity"
at some time in their lives, apparently with no convictions."
In the mid- 1 980s, after the death of Branch Davidian prophet Lois Roden,
there had been a schism in the Branch Davidians between the followers of George
Roden (Lois Roden's son) and the followers of David Koresh (who thought him
Lois Roden's proper successor). George Roden took over the Branch Davidian's
"Mount Carmel Center" at Waco, and drove Koresh's followers away at gunpoint.
Roden, currently confined in an institution for the criminally insane, did in fact
scam...this was a scam initiated by Bureau [BATF] headquarters...in my opinion, to obtain the
additional resources of the National Guard, air support assistance, etc." Joint Hearings, supra
note 3, part 1, at 379.
40. Most of the military assistance - including training, equipment, and expert advice -
can be provided as long as there is reimbursement. But "the military is not to be involved in
arrest, search or seizure or similar activities such as stop and frisk." Id. at 352 (testimony of
Gen. Walter Huffman). Further, there are certain units in the military, including JTF-6, which
are geared toward drug-law enforcement and which would not get involved in assisting gener-
al law enforcement even with reimbursement. Id. at 400 (testimony of Gen. Pickler).
41. Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Comm., Terrorism, Technology, and Gov't Inf.
Subcomm., Federal Raid in Ruby Ridge, Idaho, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. 54 (1995); Interview of
Herb Byerly, Special Agent, Burea of Alcohol, Tabacco and Firearms, Feb. 20, 1991 (transcript
on file with the Akron Law Review).
42. James L. Pate, No Peace Without Justice, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE, May 1995, at 58, 81.
43. Application and Affidavit for Search and Arrest Warrants for Vernon Wayne Howell
and the Residence of Vernon Wayne Howell, and others *7 (Waco, Tex., Feb. 25, 1993) (filed
by BATF agent, Davy Aguilera), available at <http://www.shadeslanding.com/firearms
/read6.html>.
44. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 25, at 212.
[VOL. 30:4
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set up a meth lab. But in March 1988, when Roden was sent to jail on unrelated
charges and Koresh's group took back the Mount Carmel Center, they found the
meth lab, and promptly reported it to the sheriff."5
The fall 1993 Treasury Department report on the BATF raid on the
Branch Davidians insisted that the investigation of alleged drug use was valid. '
Treasury reasoned that the sheriff's office had planned to collect the lab equip-
ment but found no record it had done so, "raising the possibility that the illegal
equipment might still have been at the Compound."4  The Treasury Report
ignores the fact that Marc Breault (a disaffected ex-Davidian), the source for
BATF's information that there had once been a meth lab at Mount Carmel, simul-
taneously told BATF agent Davy Aguilera that the building in which the meth lab
was housed had burned down in Spring 1990." Koresh was thoroughly anti-drug,
and it is improbable that he would have started operating a methamphetamine lab
after telling the sheriff about its presence.
The limit of the Treasury criticism was that there should be clearer stan-
dards about what constitutes a drug nexus, and that BATF probably should have
told the Texas National Guard (which can only be used when there is a drug
nexus) more than a day in advance that their pilots might be shot at.4 Treasury
noted, accurately, that BATF could have had just as much military assistance
without any alleged drug nexus had it been willing to reimburse the Defense
Department although the assistance could not have come from JTF-6, and the
Texas National Guard could not have been used.
B. Military Support for BATF
What kind of military support did BATF receive? Throughout February
1993, BATF agents learned at Fort Hood how to carry on a surprise military raid
against the Mount Carmel Center. 0 The training was conducted by Army Special
45. DICK REAVIS, THE ASHES OF WACO: AN INVESTIGATION 82 (1995). Branch
Davidian David Thibodeau stated: "There was absolutely no drugs at Mount Carmel, period,
other than alcohol .. . ." Joint Hearings, supra note 3, part 1, at 125.
46. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 25, at 16, 212.
47. Id. at 212. Social worker Joyce Sparks, no fan of Koresh's, had told the BATF inves-
tigators: "David Koresh explained to me that the previous prophet had been involved in drugs,
had a lab there, and [Koresh] said he had given that material - the needles and the drugs book
explaining how to make drugs - he'd given that all to the sherif's department in McLennan
County." Joint Hearings, supra note 3, part 1, at 611 (responding to a question by Rep. Steve
Chabot). See also Committee Report, supra note 22, at 46
48. Committee Report, supra note 22, at 46.
49. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 25, at 213 n.74, 214.
50. Lee Hancock, ATF Official Defends Raid Planning, DAL. MORN. NEWS, Mar. 27,
1993 at A25.
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Forces (Green Berets) from Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The Green Berets also
allegedly wrote a specific assault plan for BATF to use at Mount Carmel, and four
Green Berets were allegedly present at Mount Carmel as observers on the day of
the raid."
To carry out the raid, BATF had procured helicopters from the Texas
National Guard.2 Unlike federal law, which allows some reimbursed use of the
military even when drugs are not involved, Texas law only allows the use of its
National Guard helicopters for law enforcement -when there is a drug nexus.53
BATF also made use of the Alabama National Guard for aerial photogra-
phy. The use was authorized by a "memorandum of agreement" between the
Adjutant Generals of the Texas and Alabama National Guards. ' Even if the drug
nexus had been real, there are a number of problems with employing the Alabama
National Guard in Texas. Texas law expressly requires the governor's approval for
the entry of a military force that, like the Alabama National Guard, is not part of
the U.S. armed forces.5 But Texas Governor Ann Richards never knew about the
use of the Alabama or Texas National Guards until after the raid.56 Alabama law
limits the operation of the Alabama National Guard to the state boundaries of
Alabama." Thus, the deployment of the Alabama National Guard in Texas was a
flagrant breach of the laws of Alabama and Texas.
In addition, the "memorandum of agreement" providing for use the
Alabama National Guard in Texas violated the United States Constitution.
Agreements between two or more states require congressional consent, and
Congress had not consented to the Alabama/Texas "agreement. '58 In other words,
51. James L. Pate, Special Forces Involved in Waco Raid!, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE, May
1994, at 34-35; Pate, No Peace, supra note 42, at 58-61. For the government's version of the
training, see TREASURY REPORT, supra note 25, at 73, 78, & App. B-56.
52. The Texas Army National Guard helicopters were two OH-58 Kiowas and a UH-60A
Black Hawk. James L. Pate, ATF's Bloody Sunday, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE, June 1993, at 52.
53. Committee Report, supra note 22, at 39.
54. Id. at 34.
55. Id. The National Guard is a complex entity which most of the time is under state con-
trol, and in that capacity would be known as the "Alabama National Guard." The President has
the option of calling the National Guard into federal service, at which point the entity becomes
known as the "National Guard of the United States." Most National Guard troops are dually-
enlisted in the state and federal Guards, and take separate oaths of loyalty to each. (A few high-
ranking officers may serve only in a State Guard, and are not subject to induction into federal
service.) The Alabama National Guard, not in federal service, was covered by the Texas law
requiring the Texas Governor's permission to enter Texas.
56. Committee Report, supra note 22, at 34.
57. Id. (citing Ala. Code § 31-2-7 (1995)).
58. "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress...enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State .... U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 3; Committee Report, supra note
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the Adjutant Generals of the National Guards of Alabama and Texas executed a
"memorandum of agreement" which purported to authorize cross-border use of
the Alabama National Guard, even though the "agreement" as implemented was
in defiance of the law of Alabama, the law of Texas, and the Constitution of the
United States. It is precisely such military usurpation of civil authority-the
destruction of the rule of civil law-which is the ultimate, and real danger posed
by use of the military in law enforcement.
Shortly after the raid, Governor Richards blasted the BATF for having
lied to obtain the Texas helicopters 9.5 BATF then claimed that a British surveil-
lance airplane, recently brought onto the Waco scene, had found new thermal evi-
dence of the methamphetamine lab.' Later, a law enforcement expert from the
federal government's Sandia National Laboratories would describe evidence of a
methamphetamine lab as based on "an overflight using some very unsophisticat-
ed, forward-looking infrared devices" and detecting "the so-called hot spot on the
compound." That hot spot could have come from any number of heat sources,"
but the government chose it to be indicative of a meth lab.6 2 (At Ruby Ridge, the
thermal "hot spot" which was asserted to be the site of Randy Weaver's drug lab
was actually a dog house.) An anonymous BATF source told a reporter that the
new drug allegation "was made up . .. out of whole cloth ... a complete fabri-
cation" to avoid further criticism from Governor Richards. 3
C. Helicopters, Machine Pistols, and other Weapons
1. Helicopters
While the National Guard helicopters were not armed, at least some of
22, at 34-35. The general rule of interpretation for this clause of the Constitution, as stated in
Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893), and United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax
Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978), is that Congressional consent is required for agreements which
increase the political power of the states to the possible detriment of federal powers. See
Committee Report, supra note 22 n. 166, 169. Since the Alabama Governor has no legal author-
ity to command the Alabama National Guard beyond the boundaries of Alabama (Ala. Code §
31-2-7 (1995)), and since the Governor of Texas was not even aware of the Alabama Guard's
presence in her state, the Alabama Guard was under the practical command of neither
Governor, and was thus, in essence, a rogue military force, answerable only to itself. The exis-
tence of such a force poses an obvious danger to federal supremacy, and hence would likely be
unconstitutional under the principles of Virginia and United States Steel.
59. DAVID B. KOPEL & PAUL H. BLACKMAN, No MORE WACOS: WHAT'S WRONG
WITH FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND How TO FIX IT 89 (1997).
60. Id.
61. See Joint Hearings, supra note 3, part 1, at 308-309 (testimony of Wade Ishimoto).
62. Id.
63. James L. Pate, Gun Gestapo's Day of Infamy, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE, June 1993, at
48, 50.
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the BATF agents on board the helicopters were carrying MP-5 machine pistols,
contrary to assertions by some government officials.64 Significant evidence sug-
gests that the BATF agents in the helicopters strafed the roof of the building. For
example, Dr. Bruce Perry examined the Branch Davidian children who left the
compound in the weeks following the BATF raid. One child drew a picture of a
house beneath a rainbow. Perry asked, "Is there anything else?" and the child then
drew bullet holes in the roof.65 Newsweek magazine reprinted the Davidian
girl's picture of her home with a dotted roof. "Bullets" the girl explained.6
Catherine Matteson, a seventy-two-year-old Branch Davidian woman not
accused of any crimes, was interviewed by the Las Vegas Review-Journal. She
clearly recalled seeing helicopters firing through the roof and walls of the resi-
dence, stating "I saw the yellow flashes." 67 When machine guns fire, there is a
yellow flash of muzzle blast, visible even in daylight. During the negotiations,
Koresh and his chief aide, Steve Schneider, insisted that there were at least five
witnesses who saw three helicopters come over and start shooting into Koresh's
room, destroying his television set.
68
Schneider's attorney, Jack Zimmermann, who went into the Branch
Davidian house during the siege, later testified that he saw many bullet holes in
the ceilings with a downward trajectory, indicating that the helicopters had been
firing into the compound from above.69 There is no nearby high ground from
which BATF agents not in helicopters could have shot bullets into the building
64. Joint Hearings, supra note 3, part 1, at 383 (statement of Rep. Steve Chabot). During
the siege, a heated discussion between BATF negotiator Jim Cavanaugh and Koresh regarding
guns on the helicopters ended with their calmly agreeing that there were no guns mounted on
the helicopters but that agents on the 'copters had guns. Negot. Tapes, supra note 18, no. 42,
at 29-31 (Mar. 4, 1993).
65. Sue Anne Pressley, Waco Cult's Children Describe Beatings, Lectures, War Games,
WASH. POST, May 5, 1993, at Al, A17.
66. Melinda Beck, Someone Dropped the Ball, NEWSWEEK, May 17, 1993, at 51. See also
Lynne Lamberg, Children and Families Need Help After Disasters, 275 JAMA 1714-1715
(June 12, 1996).
67. Vin Suprynowicz, Speaking the Unpalatable Truth, THE LIBERTARIAN, Sep. 15, 1996,
available at <http://www.nguworld.com/vindex/> (visited May 12, 1997).
68. Negot. Tapes, supra note 18, no. 50, at 16 (Mar. 4-5, 1993); no. 109, at 20 (Mar. 10-
11, 1993). Some of the guns were at a gun show with Davidian financier and gun-show regu-
lar, Paul Fatta. He missed the shootout, made no effort to break in, and was arrested long after
the battle, peacefully, and tried and convicted on gun-law violations. REAVIS, supra note 45,
at 37-38, 152-53, 291-92; Michael deCourcy Hinds, A Believer, Says Cult in Texas is Peaceful
Despite Shootout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1993, at 1, 8.
69. Joint Hearings, supra note 3, part 2, at 25. Dick DeGuerin, Koresh's attorney, went
inside the compound during the siege, to try to convince Koresh to surrender. Id. DeGuerin
said that he saw "bullet holes in the ceiling of the highest room in the compound ....The only
way those bullets could have been made was from someone standing on the roof shooting
down, or someone shooting from the helicopters." Id. at 25, 37. DeGuerin and Jack
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with a steep downward trajectory.
The BATF stated the helicopters were simply used as a "diversionary
device" during the raid, to draw attention to the back of the building, while the
BATF ground forces entered the front; no shots came from the helicopters.7"BATF
agent Davy Aguilera, who was in one of the helicopters, testified to Congress that
the agents in the helicopters were armed, and had been told that they were allowed
to fire in self-defense.7' Aguilera maintained that no shots were fired from the
helicopters.
At least during wartime, there are sound tactical reasons for beginning an
assault on a building by strafing the second story roof. The bullets coming through
the ceiling will force people on the second floor to retreat to the first floor. It will
therefore be easier for assault personnel to enter the second story (a key element
of the BATF raid was getting an entry team into the "gun room" on the second
story, where the Branch Davidian rifles and ammunition were kept). In addition,
riflemen defending the building against ground attack will be deprived of the
advantage of an elevated firing position. Also, strafing the second-floor gun stor-
age room would prevent the Davidians from retrieving their weapons prior to the
imminent arrival of BATF land forces.
But strafing a building is not a particularly effective way to rescue chil-
dren who are thought to be in danger. The second story of the Mount Carmel
Center was known to be the living quarters for the women and children, and for
Koresh; other men were not allowed up there.72
Strafing the roof, if it happened, might well be considered grotesquely
excessive use of force for serving a search warrant. The persons who did the straf-
Zimmermann (Steve Schneider's attorney, who went into the compound with DeGuerin) said
they saw bullet holes in Koresh's bedroom, in addition to bullet holes in the gun room. Id. at
105, 138. The bullet holes in the gun room, unlike those in the bedroom, could have come from
agents who climbed onto the roof and who participated in the firefight at the gun room. Id.
The Texas Rangers, who investigated the February 28 gun battle, testified that they found
no evidence of shooting from helicopters, although the Rangers were unable to offer an alter-
native explanation for how the bullet holes described by DeGuerin could have been created.
Id. at 197-98.
70. Defense Rests without Calling Cultists, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1994, at A20.
71. Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 270.
72. In the course of the negotiations, when the FBI suggested sending in a videotape
showing the children who had left the residence, Koresh and his followers remarked that heli-
copter fire through the ceiling had damaged his television, and the Davidians would have to
check to see if they had working TVs to use with their VCRs. Negot. Tapes, supra note 18,
no. 50, at 16, 17, 22 (Mar. 4-5, 1993).
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ing might be considered guilty of reckless endangerment or homicide. If the
Davidians fired first at the helicopters, then return fire at particular targets would
be lawful, but not random firing through a roof."
Whether lawful or not, the federal government's alleged machine-gun-
ning a roof that covered dozens of women and children would probably have
been ill-received by the press and public. If there were hundreds of bullet holes
in the roof, there would have been a motive for the federal government to
destroy the evidence by having the building burned down, as Steve Schneider
noted in the course of the subsequent negotiations. 4
2. Armor-piercing Ammunition
If BATF forces on the ground were using the armor-piercing 9mm
Cyclone ammunition (as some sources claim)75, such action was in disregard for
the safety of noncombatants. BATF knew, or should have known, that the armor-
piercing ammunition it was using could easily penetrate the thin walls of the
compound at Mount Carmel Center, endangering the children whom the BATF
claimed to be protecting from abuse.76
BATF's perception was very different, that the agents were expressly
armed mostly with 9-mm machine pistols. "We knew there was a lot of children
in there. And we knew there were a lot of women and innocents in there... .And
with all these innocents in there, our teams... took mostly 9-mm firearms that
they knew would not penetrate those walls, they knew would-not go through and
hit innocent children. And, so, in essence, the beating we took was because we
were trying not to have firearms that would go through the walls."" Actually,
73. Branch Davidian rifle shots did hit at least one of the helicopters, forcing it to make
an emergency landing.
74. Negot. Tapes, supra note 18, no. 122, at 18 (Mar. 13, 1993).
75. Pate, Day of Infamy, supra note 63, at 62. The Treasury Report does not address the
issue of Cyclone ammunition. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 25.
76. Joint Hearings, supra note 3, part 1, at 91 (testimony of Stuart Wright). The Treasury
Report states that the Davidians killed by BATF agents were struck with 9mm HydraShok
rounds, not the Cyclone. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 25, at 104.
The Cyclone, as armor-piercing handgun ammunition, is banned from sale to civilians. 18.
U.S.C. § 922(a)(8)&(9) (1994). Perhaps it is worth considering whether sale of such deadly
ammunition to the government should also be prohibited.
77. Joint Hearings, supra note 3, part 2, at 329 (testimony of BATF Agent James
Cavanaugh). BATF Deputy Director for Enforcement, Dan Hartnett, confirmed that he cur-
tailed AR- 15 use because of the rifle bullets' ability to penetrate, but some AR- I5s were used
since they were requested, and the assault was to occur in a non-urban setting. Id. part 1, at
266.
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9-mm rounds can penetrate thin walls like those at the Mount Carmel residence.
3. Machine Pistols
More fundamentally, BATF's claim that it went into the Mount Carmel
Center underarmed is ludicrous. Ten agents were carrying AR- 15 semiautomatic
rifles.7 This rifle, whose rounds can certainly penetrate walls, has been described
by the BATF itself as an extremely powerful "assault weapon" primarily useful
for mass murder.'
The majority of agents, though, were armed with Heckler & Koch MP-5
machine pistols.8 0 These weapons are sold almost exclusively to the military and
police. The advertising to civilian law enforcement conveys the message that by
owning the weapon, the civilian officer will be the equivalent of a member of an
61ite military strike force, such as the Navy SEALs. The ad copy links civilian law
enforcement to military combat, with lines like "From the Gulf War to the Drug
War." As one criminologist notes, "The MP5 series is the pride and the staple of
police tactical operations units, and it holds a central place in the paramilitary
police subculture. Its imposing, futuristic style overshadows its utility as a supe-
rior 'urban warfare' weapon." 81
Functionally, the MP-5 is a perfectly fine weapon. But when law enforce-
ment agencies are procuring weapons, they need to consider not only their
mechanical characteristics, but also how officers in the field will use them. When
a weapon's advertising and styling deliberately blur the line between warfare and
law enforcement, it is not unreasonable to expect that some officers-especially
when under stress-will start behaving as if they were in the military. That is pre-
cisely what happened when the BATF agents began firing indiscriminately into
78. An "AR-15" is an automatic rifle. Many persons informally use "AR-15" for semi-
automatic rifles which have the same outward appearance - but not the same internal compo-
nents - as the automatic AR-15. The BATF rifles were semiautomatics, but we follow BATF's
usage in calling them "AR-15s," since we do not know exactly which model the BATF rifles
were.
79. We do not agree with this characterization of the semiautomatic rifle, or of any other
so-called "assault weapons." The point is that BATF, while claiming to be only lightly armed,
was using ten rifles described by BATF officials as extremely powerful mass murder weapons.
80. A machine pistol is a machine gun that is also a pistol (as opposed to a rifle). Such
weapons are also called submachine guns. The government sometimes defines things differ-
ently for government and private use. At the trial of the Davidians, agents frequently testified
that the MP-5 was a semi-automatic firearm even though it can fire a two-round burst, which
would make it a machinegun under federal law. United States v. Brad Branch, No. W-93-CR-
046 (W.D.Tex., 1994), at 2025, 2030-33, 2589, 2815-16, and 3152-53.
81. Peter B. Kraska, Enjoying Militarism: Political/Personal Dilemmas in Studying U.S.
Police Paramilitary Units, 13 JUSTICE Q. 403, 412 (Sept. 1996).
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the building.s2
No one will ever be certain whether more agents might have obeyed
BATF training and the law-to fire only at visible targets who pose a threat-if
the agents had been armed with other weapons. But it is hardly likely that Heckler
& Koch's militaristic marketing of the MP-5 helped promote responsible law
enforcement behavior at Waco. As the Waco disaster illustrates, there are pro-
found dangers to allowing domestic law enforcement agencies to acquire
weapons of war.
IV. THE WACO SIEGE AND THE HOSTAGE RESCUE TEAM
After the Branch Davidians repelled the BATF raid on February 28, 1993,
the FBI was called into Waco to add professionalism to a law-enforcement dis-
aster. While there were over 600 FBI employees at Waco, two groups were most
important: the negotiators, and the hostage rescue team."
The negotiating team, with the support of FBI psychological and research
staff, conducted telephone negotiations with the Branch Davidians.? The FBI
Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) took control of the perimeter of the 77-acre Branch
Davidian ranch. As it turned out, the militaristic Hostage Rescue Team repeated-
ly sabotaged the progress being made by the negotiators.
The Hostage Rescue Team was originally created to rescue Americans
abroad who were being held hostage by terrorists. The HRT is trained by Delta
Force, the U.S. Army's counter-terrorism squad. But the HRT has frequently been
deployed not to rescue hostages in other countries, or even in the United States,
but instead as some kind of special force to deal with particularly troublesome
domestic criminals. This deployment-at Ruby Ridge, Waco, and elsewhere-
has led to predictably disastrous consequences. A team trained to rescue hostages
being held by foreign terrorists is an 61ite strike force. They must attack rapidly,
neutralize the terrorists (i.e. kill them), and extricate the hostages. Rather than
82. At the trial, Texas Rangers testified that they found forty used shell casings (in the
same caliber as the BATF weapons) more than 300 yards from the house. Much Evidence and
Conflict in Branch Davidians' Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1994, at A12. Agent Timothy
Gaborie testified that he fired twenty-five to thirty shots in the direction of the house, without
looking where he was shooting. Lift for Defense in Cultists' Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1994,
at A28.
83. To be precise, there were 668 from the FBI, 136 from BATF, 6 from Customs, 15 from
the Army, 131 from the Texas Department of Public Safety Patrol; 13 from the Texas National
Guard, and 31 from Texas Rangers. CAROL MOORE, THE DAVIDIAN MASSACRE 223 (1995).
84. See Committee Report, supra note 22, at 55-58; Negot. Tapes, supra note 18.
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shooting only when clearly necessary to prevent harm to an innocent, a hostage
rescue team must neutralize the terrorists at the first opportunity, before the ter-
rorists have an opportunity to pose an imminent threat.
Persons trained for this specific, important mission, are highly unfit for
domestic law enforcement tasks, in which the objective is to capture suspected
criminals (not kill them), to minimize the use of force, and to act with a scrupu-
lous regard for the United States Constitution.
Philip Heymann, who served as deputy attorney general in the first year
of the Clinton administration, has suggested that the Hostage Rescue Team only
be used for rescuing hostages. The problems caused by infrequent use of the HRT
are far outweighed by use of the Hostage Rescue Team in non-hostage situations."
Professor Heymann's suggestion should be put into the United States Code.
At Waco, the Hostage Rescue Team had no hostages to rescue. 6 They
defined themselves as being in a "Complex Hostage Rescue Barricade Situation."
But to the extent there were hostages at Mount Carmel, the Branch Davidians
were hostage in their own home because they were afraid of what the Hostage
Rescue Team and the federal government would do to them and their children.'
The Hostage Rescue Team's arrogance is a well-known problem in law
enforcement. As Treasury Undersecretary for Law Enforcement Ron Noble
observed, "when they come into an operation, they take over, and I've been with
other law enforcement officers when it happens, and it is not something that
makes law enforcement officers, who believe they're able, happy. That's just the
way it is." 8 At Waco, the HRT rapidly established bad relations with the Texas
Rangers.
85. Philip B. Heymann, The Hostage Team Is for Hostages, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1995,
at A19.
86. The HRT's motto is "To save lives," but this would turn out to be a particularly cruel
version of doublespeak. The hostage-holding Hostage Rescue Team was referred to by the FBI
as the "tactical" component at Waco, with the other component being the negotiators.
"Tactical" is the word currently used for paramilitary groups like the HRT or SWAT Teams.
Members of these groups often belong to the National Tactical Officers Association. The pri-
mary meaning of "tactical" is "of or pertaining to military or naval tactics." 2 NEW SHORTER
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 3201-02 (1993). Thus, "tactical" is a literally accurate, but
lacks the frightening edge of words like "paramilitary" or "militaristic."
87. See Negot. Tapes, supra note 18; KOPEL & BLACKMUN, supra note 59, at 130.
88. Joint Hearings, supra note 3, part 1, at 917. Chief FBI negotiator Gary Noesner
explained that the tactical forces, such as the HRT, are inclined toward the "action imperative"
while the negotiators lean toward "active listening," where they try to "find ways to explain to
the barricaded subject why it is in his best interest to seek a nonviolent solution." Committee
Report, supra note 22, at 56. He went on to note: "I do not awake from nightmares or have
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The HRT began with an anti-negotiation bias. Jeffrey Jamar, the Special
Agent in Charge of the San Antonio FBI office, was commander of the entire
operation at Waco, and of sorting out the conflicting views of the HRT and the
FBI negotiation team. Jamar's immediate superior was Larry Potts, the Assistant
Director of the Criminal Investigation Section.9 Jamar personally had no training
in negotiations; he "left that to the experts." 9 The advice of negotiators general-
ly was ignored in favor the HRT's position to steadily increase pressure on the
Branch Davidians. This proved to be a fatal error.91
One of the negotiators later noted that while sometimes negotiators and
"tactical component" (the HRT or SWAT teams) agree about how to achieve suc-
cess, in Waco:
there was a fundamental strategy disagreement and what was the best
way to proceed?...the negotiation team wanted to have a lower-keyed
approach. The team's approach was to apply pressure. Part of
that...was driven by the fact that the tactical team, as Mr. Jamar indi-
cated, was exposed to open fire. We were dealing with the most
complex situation we have ever had in the United States, where
there had already been a demonstrated willingness to use force....So
the need to provide them with adequate cover, to contain the situa-
tion, had an impact on conveying, perhaps, a message that Mr.
Koresh did not want to hear.92
But it was not just Koresh who was upset by HRT actions. The ordinary
Branch Davidians were also upset, particularly by the actions of the Bradley tanks
driven by the HRT.93 It was their understanding that the original cease-fire agree-
ment included Davidians not threatening law enforcement with firearms in
exchange for law enforcement staying off Davidian property. Instead, the tanks
trouble sleeping at night...because everything that I predicted would happen, did happen." Id.
at 57.
89. MOORE, supra note 83, at 222-23.
90. Joint Hearings, supra note 3, part 2, at 299 (testimony of Jeffrey Jamar).
91. "I didn't know at the time that there were conflicts between the people and the nego-
tiators .. " Id. at 428 (testimony of Janet Reno).
"Smerick notes that the FBI commanders were action oriented. They wanted to treat
Koresh not as a negotiating partner, but rather as a psychotic criminal, who needed to be caught
and punished." Id. (quote read by Rep. Hyde).
92. Id. at 316 (testimony of Gary Noesner).
93. Shortly after the siege had begun, former McLennan County District Attorney Vic
Feazell (who had unsuccessfully prosecuted Koresh for attempted murder in 1987), noted the
mobilization of military equipment. "The feds are preparing to kill them," said Feazell. 'That
way they can bury their mistakes." Roy Bragg, Standoff At Cult Compound/Ex-Prosecutor
Laments Agents' "Storm Trooper" Tactics, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 2, 1993, at A7.
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not only ran around the Davidian property, but damaged outbuildings and dese-
crated a cemetery.'
The tanks frightened the children remaining at Mount Carmel Center."9
The FBI negotiators insisted there was nothing to worry about, since "nobody's
going to run tanks through buildings that contain people."' In response to the
expressed concerns of Cyrus Koresh (David Koresh's oldest child, age eight)
about a tank assault on the building, the FBI negotiator promised "the last thing
in the world that's going to happen is for the government to take any type of offen-
sive action here. It's just not going to happen. You know, we don't hurt babies,
you know, we don't hurt women, we don't do those types of things."97
HRT commander Dick Rogers later testified that the sole purpose for the
Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) was agent safety; some BATF agents had been
wounded by grenades, and the Branch Davidians had a pair of .50 caliber rifles.9"
When Koresh told negotiators that he could destroy the nine Bradley Fighting
Vehicles (BFVs) that were originally brought on-site, the BFVs were supple-
mented with two M-1A1 Abrams tanks and five M278 Combat Engineering
Vehicles.' Once in place, however, the tanks were used for purposes that did not
seem defensive. At various times, tanks would charge at the building. One person
94. See infra note 119.
95. Negot. Tapes, supra note 18, no. 88, at 13-14 (Mar. 7, 1993). One FBI explanation for
the wild driving of tanks was that it was young agents' only chance to drive tanks, so they were
acting a bit reckless, like kids. Id. no. 53 at 13-14 (Mar. 5, 1993). FBI official Larry Potts later
explained, with an infelicitous choice of words, "We had to put our hostage rescue people
through a crash course on learning to drive those vehicles." Joint Hearings, supra note 3, part
3, at 68. In response to the suggestion that the Bradley's 25mm barrels posed a threat, the FBI
insisted the tanks had no barrels, just "tubes in a barrel mount." Negot. Tapes, supra note 18,
no. 84, at 37 (Mar. 7, 1993); no. 85, at 32 (Mar. 7, 1993).
The FBI offered to remove the tanks if the Davidians agreed first to send out four women
and four children, and then, once the tanks were removed, if everyone else in the compound
came out. Id. no. 68, at 9-10 (Mar. 6, 1993).
96. Negot. Tape supra note 18, no. 95, at 9 (Mar. 8-9, 1993).
97. Id. no. 88, at 13 (Mar. 7, 1993).
98. "No Question " Fire was Set by Davidians, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1995 (Federal News
Service transcript).
99. Victoria Loe, FBI's "A-Team" Plying Varied Skills in Sect Talks But Experts Say
Obstacles Numerous, DAL. MORN. NEWS, Mar. 14, 1993 at Al; Moore, supra note 83, at 233;
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE
EVENTS AT WACO, TEXAS, FEBRUARY 28 TO APRIL 19, 1993, at 123-24 (1993) [hereinafter
JUSTICE REPORT].
While Steve Schneider complained regularly about the tanks, Koresh was more threaten-
ing, saying the Davidians would use something bigger than .50 caliber, something that could
incinerate part of a tank, and then saying the Bradleys were not a concern, "that's why we
haven't done nothing to them yet." Negot. Tapes, supra note 18, no. 49, at 2-3 (Mar. 4, 1993);
no. 53, at 15-16 (Mar. 5, 1993); no. 68, at 8 (Mar. 6, 1993).
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inside the building reported that men in the vehicles were "shooting the finger at
these kids,"'' and in at least one case "mooned" the Davidians.'0 '
There were numerous problems in the negotiations between the FBI and
the Branch Davidians. The FBI had no expertise-and no interest in acquiring any
expertise-regarding the Branch Davidian religion. Koresh was, very likely, men-
tally ill." The Branch Davidian negotiators and the FBI negotiators were both
often guilty of dishonesty or disingenuousness; and while the Branch Davidians
preached at the FBI negotiators-to the extent the negotiators would allow
them-the Davidians generally refused to provide straightforward explanations of
their religion or intentions. But of all the factors impeding negotiations, perhaps
the greatest factor-in retrospect, the decisive factor-was the Hostage Rescue
Team. While the FBI negotiators were in a building miles away from Mount
Carmel, at Texas State Technical College, the FBI team (the HRT) was laying
siege to the Branch Davidians. HRT sniper teams stared at Mount Carmel, while
Branch Davidian sentries stared back. At times, the action-oriented HRT would
take action, simply because it could stand the inaction no longer. For example, the
HRT temporarily cut off the electricity to the Mount Carmel Center-not for any
negotiating or safety purpose-but simply to boost the morale of the tactical "peo-
ple," and the rest of law enforcement "who [were] out and cold and away from
100. Like BATF, the FBI made extensive use of U.S. military equipment and training.
Materials supplied under the Freedom of Information Act make it clear that, unlike BATF, the
FBI did not pretend Waco was a drug operation. Therefore, the Defense Department was reim-
bursed by the Justice Department, military equipment had military markings covered, and mil-
itary personnel trained FBI personnel but did not themselves use the equipment in operations
against Mount Carmel Center. JUSTICE REPORt, supra note 99, at 123. In practical terms, the
FBI actions appeared as militaristic as the BATF's: a tank attack looks military even if some
markings are covered up, and even if the unseen driver is not a soldier. As the House
Committee Report observed, "images of the tanks and other military vehicles gave the impres-
sion that the FBI was using excessive force together with military weapons and tactics against
U.S. citizens, contrary to our civilian law enforcement tradition." Committee Report, supra
note 22, at 7.
101. Joint Hearings, supra note 3, part 3, at 117 (testimony of Clive Doyle). The moon-
ing was condemned by negotiators as unprofessional and unacceptable, and caused by "frus-
tration and anguish," Negot. Tapes, supra note 18, no. 89, at 16 (Mar. 7, 1993); REAVIS, supra
note 45, at 249.
102. Ever since a 1985 trip to Israel, Koresh had been hearing a disembodied voice which
revealed Bible secrets to him. In a 1987 teaching session, Howell described one of his experi-
ences with the voice:
What - what if you turned on the water in the shower and all of a sudden it said,
"Drop down ye waters from above, let the faucets pour out righteousness. I the
Lord have created it." Huh? You know. Sh- and, and the songs of blessing, show-
ers of blessing, starts being heard in your room or in the bathroom, right? I mean
let's face it. Let's be realistic now. This guy is freaked out, isn't he? OK? He's -
this - Cyrus [Koresh] has an experience which none - very few and far in
between have had.
The Shower Head Tape 26 (Aug. 24, 1987) (teaching session of David
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home." 03 As Dr. Alan Stone (an independent reviewer of the Justice Department
report on Waco) later observed, some of the tactical measures were mainly used
"to relieve [the action-oriented] agents' desire to act."' "
A modicum of apparent conflict between negotiators and the tactical
commanders can be useful-the out-of-custody equivalent of "good cop, bad
cop" interrogations"-but the conflict between the negotiating and tactical team
was much more profound. The negotiating team found itself having to come up
with excuses for aggressive tactical actions that the tactical team had not bothered
to tell the negotiators about. The tactical team grew increasingly frustrated with
the negotiators' allegedly excessive patience with the Branch Davidians. The two
FBI teams were often at cross purposes.
For example, after days of discussions, the negotiators finally decided to
send some milk in for the Branch Davidian babies; the tactical team promptly cut
off the electricity, making it difficult to store the milk. The electricity cut-off post-
poned the departure of two Davidians whom the negotiators had convinced to
make plans to leave, but would no longer even talk about it."'
6
Shortly after midnight on March 21, two Davidians left, and later during
the day, five more exited. The number of people inside had declined to about 84,
from a total of about 127 on the morning of the BATF raid.' 7 The negotiators and
Schneider agreed in general that it had been a very successful day.1"1
That same day, FBI commander Jeff Jamar and HRT leader Dick Rogers
decided to increase tactical pressure in order to "demonstrate the authority of law
enforcement."''
That evening, a loudspeaker barrage began. Among the items blasted on
the loudspeakers were the sounds of dentists' drills, locomotives, helicopters hov-
ering, loud obnoxious music,"0 Christmas songs, Tibetan Buddhist chants, previ-
Koresh)<http://www.ime.net/-mswett/shower.html> (the authors have changed some of the
punctuation in the transcript, which the transcriber describes as a first draft.).
103. Joint Hearings, supra note 3, part 2, at 320 (testimony of Jeffrey Jamar).
104. Committee Report, supra note 22, at 57.
105. At one point, when a negotiator blamed the commanders, Koresh summarized the
commanders' viewpoint: "They want patience, and they want it now." Negot. Tapes, supra
note 18, no. 99, at 34 (Mar. 9, 1993).
106. Id. no. 122, at 8, 28-30 (Mar. 13, 1993).
107. See JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 99, at 76-77, 112; TREASURY REPORT, supra note
25, at 104, 106; Joint Hearings, supra note 3, part 2, at 496 (testimony of Byron Sage).
108. Negot. Tapes, supra note 18, no. 152.
109. JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 99, at 135.
110. See KOPEL & BLACKMIN, supra note 59, at 171 n.70; JUSTICE REPORT, supra note
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ously recorded negotiations,'" squawking birds, cows mooing, clocks ticking,
telephone busy signals, and the cries of rabbits being killed." 2
The loudspeakers were used contrary to the negotiators' advice, and the
advice of the FBI's psychological experts, who had warned that tactical pressure
"would succeed in shutting down negotiations and convince Koresh and his fol-
lowers that the end was near.""' FBI psychologist Peter Smerick warned that tac-
tical pressure "might unintentionally make Koresh's vision of a fiery end come
true." "' Commander Jamar later evaded questions at a Congressional hearing and
from a Justice Department investigator about who, if anyone, advised Jamar that
the increased tactical pressure would be wise.'"
The Davidian response was fury and dismay. Koresh said that no more
people would be coming out. In fact, only three more persons did exit, once the
increased pressure began. Livingstone Fagan left on March 23. The other two
exits were non-Davidians who had sneaked into the Mount Carmel Center during
the siege out of curiosity."16
Over the course of the siege, FBI tank drivers destroyed a mobile home,
a dozen motorcycles, two dozen children's go-carts (expensive presents, recently
acquired), tricycles, and bicycles; knocked out the windshield of a bus; and flat-
tened a pickup truck."7 Cars belonging to the adults were crushed by tanks, or
ripped apart with crowbars, with the windows smashed and the tires slashed.,"
The Hostage Rescue Team "carried away the fence from Mount Carmel's front
yard, flipped a bass fishing boat, and overturned a bulldozer that the community
had rented-for some $3,000 per month-from a local building supply house."1 9
Neither destroying children's toys, nor desecrating the cemetery of high-
ly religious people is apt to facilitate negotiations. Instead, the destruction under-
99, at 78.
111. See KOPEL & BLACKMIN, supra note 59, at 171 n.70; JUSTICE REPORT, supra note
99, at 82.
112. JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 99, at 88.
113. Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Stand-
Off in Waco, Texas, February 28 to April 19, 1993 (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Oct. 8, 1993) (redact-
ed version).
114. Committee Report, supra note 22, at 57-58.
115. MOORE, supra note 83, at 269.
116. JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 99, at 83, 88, 97, 107.
117. REAVIS, supra note 45, at 224.
118. Id. See also Negot. Tapes, supra note 18, nos. 69-70 (Mar. 6, 1993).
119. REAVIS, supra note 45, at 224. "The government's tracked vehicles also planed the
surface of the Mt. Carmel cemetery, leaving Anna Hughes, among others, to await Judgment
in an unmarked plot." Id.
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mined the FBI negotiators who were promising gentle treatment for children and
adults who left the compound. The tactical team's decisions to increase pressure,
often undertaken without consulting the negotiating team, made the efforts of the
negotiating team to build trust increasingly difficult.2 FBI negotiator Byron Sage
later acknowledged that having the tanks flatten the cars was a huge mistake that
dramatically changed the course of negotiations.'
It is impossible to know if negotiations would have succeeded but for the
aggressive acts of the HRT, but it is clear that the "tactical" activities played a
major role in destroying the negotiators' efforts to create an atmosphere of trust.
V. GROUPTHINK
Neither the Branch Davidians, nor the BATF, nor the FBI, were com-
posed of or led by stupid persons. Yet at Waco, all of these groups made extreme-
ly bad decisions. One reason for the high-risk, low-quality decisions of the Branch
Davidians, BATF, and FBI is what is known as "groupthink." 22 The term group
think was created by academics in the early 1970s, to describe how groups of
intelligent individuals could collectively make decisions much worse than the
individuals might have made if they had decided alone. Public policy disasters
which have been studied as instances of groupthink include the Bay of Pigs inva-
sion during the Kennedy administration; the Johnson administration's escalation
of the Vietnam War; the Carter administration's Iranian hostage rescue mission;
the decision of Morton Thiokol managers to proceed with the Space Shuttle
Challenger launch in 1986 despite the warnings of engineers, in order not to inter-
fere with NASA's desire for a timely launch which would help NASA politically;
and the Reagan administration's Iran-Contra fiasco.
Many of the factors leading to groupthink were present, on all sides, at
Waco. First, in groups which are vulnerable to groupthink, group members tend
to value the group above everything else. The social isolation of law enforcement
officers from the non-police community has been documented by many
researchers.'23 Unquestioning adherence to group norms is likely all the higher in
special high-prestige law enforcement groups, such as the FBI, the HRT, or the
Special Response Teams (the BATF versions of the HRT). The Branch Davidians,
of course, explicitly saw their church as the only good thing in a Babylonian
world permeated by sin.
120. Peter J. Boyer, Children of Waco, THE NEW YORKER, May 15, 1995, at 40.
121. Richard Leiby, "Frontline": What Went Wrong at Waco? WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1995
122. The discussion of groupthink is based on PAUL T. HART, GROUPTHINK IN
GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF SMALL GROUPS AND POLICY FAILURE (1990), which summa-
*rizes previous research on groupthink, while also making substantial original contributions.
123. See, e.g., JONATHAN RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE 434-35 (1973).
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Groupthinking groups tend to have certain structural flaws: insularity; no
tradition of impartial leadership; no norms requiring methodical decision-making;
and a homogeneous background for their members. The militaristic HRT and
SRTs, heavily drawn from ex-military personnel, had these flaws, as did the
BATF and the FBI. While the Branch Davidians were highly heterogeneous in
terms of race, nationality, and social background, they were intensely homoge-
neous in their ideology.
Groups likely to suffer from groupthink often overestimate their group's
morality and invulnerability, while also stereotyping out-groups. The Branch
Davidians thought themselves the only righteous people in the world, thought
themselves invulnerable if God wanted them to be invulnerable, and stereotyped
their adversaries as the Babylonian tools of Satan. Conversely, the FBI and BATF
stereotyped their adversaries as "cultists," and acted as if resistance to the armed
might of the government were inherently immoral.
Groupthink tends to produce self-censorship among the dissenters, as
when FBI behavioral psychologist Peter Smerick changed his memos to support
the aggressive "tactical" approach that his superiors wanted.
Groupthink is more likely to occur in a provocative situation with high
amounts of external stress. In these situations, groupthink is especially likely
when the members of the group have little hope for better solutions than those
proposed by the leader. The attractiveness of the Branch Davidians' alternative to
Koresh-surrendering to the FBI-was greatly undermined by the government's
treatment of the adults and children who did surrender.'24
Deindividuation results in individuals becoming less self-aware, and
more inclined to go along with group decisions. Rather than taking personal
responsibility for their own actions, de-individuated people see responsibility as
diffused, and placed on the group as a whole. The diffusion of responsibility leads
to more aggressive behavior towards outsiders.
Some social scientists believe that an important factor leading to deindi-
viduation is anonymity, and at least at Waco, the results were consistent with this
theory. Except for Koresh, the Branch Davidians were thoroughly anonymized.
They were treated-and they acted-as if they were just a mass of indistinguish-
able followers of Koresh.
124. Every adult who left was immediately arrested. The children were put in a group
home, contrary to negotiators' promises that the children would be sent to relatives.
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Anonymity is intensified when the group all wears the same clothing. The
HRT and SRT members not only wore identical "assault" clothing, they even
wore identical tactical masks, the most anonymizing piece of clothing possible. ,25
The individual members of SRTs never would have shot wildly into a building
containing women and children. Nor would the HRT members, as individuals,
torture children with chemical warfare agents, or destroy someone else's home. It
was only in the context of groupthink, of the diffusion of responsibility, that peo-
ple could collectively perpetrate atrocities they would never perpetrate individu-
ally.'26
Bad decisions tend to breed more bad decisions, "the tendency to become
entrapped in a spiral of ineffective policies."' 7 In the Iran-Contra cases, the North-
McFarlane group made more and more commitments to arm the Iranians "because
so much had been invested already and the alleged costs of stopping would be
unacceptable."'2 At Waco, the heavy commitment to training for the BATF raid
helped create a perceived necessity to going forward with the raid, no matter
what. Once four lives of federal agents had been lost, federal law enforcement
became entrapped into finding some way to rationalize those four deaths, by
achieving a "victory" over the Branch Davidians. The Branch Davidians were
even more heavily invested in their previous mistakes. Most had given up their
old lives to move to the Mount Carmel Center. Husbands and wives had given up
their marriages. To admit that Koresh was a false messiah, not a person who was
worth dying for, would be to admit that the Branch Davidians had squandered
their careers, their families, and their earlier faiths, for nothing at all.
125. [I]n the repressive and military parts of the state apparatus, there is a large reser-
voir of the type of highly-cohesive, uniformity-inducing, depersonalizing groups
acting under external pressures which most closely fit the deindividuation profile
.... [P]olice and military are uniformed (compare the appearance of modern anti-
riot police, complete with helmets, gas masks--indeed the unrecognizability of
individual officers has been a constant source of criticism and claims from protest-
ing groups who claimed this had a disinhibiting effect upon police officers during
disturbances, leading to excessively violent behavior) .... [Tlight discipline and
uniformity of conduct are part of the occupational socialization and culture.
126. Moreover, by the mere fact that he forms part of an organised crowd, a man
descends several rungs on the ladder of civilization. Isolated, he may be a culti-
vated individual; in a crowd, he is a barbarian - that is, a creature acting by
instinct. He possesses the spontaneity, the violence, the ferocity, and also the
enthusiasm and heroism of primitive beings... to be induced to commit acts con-
trary to his most obvious interests and best-known habits.
GUSTAVE LE BON, THE CROWD: A STUDY OF THE POPULAR MIND 12-13 (2d ed.
1968)(translation of Psychologie des Foules)
127. HART, supra note 122, at 280.
128. Id. at 281.
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Groupthink often leads the group to ignore risks which affect only the
stereotyped outgroup. While the BATF and the Branch Davidians both exposed
themselves, as well as their "enemies" to high risks, the FBI's April 19 tank and
chemical warfare assault was a risky decision in which almost all the risks would
be borne by the outgroup--even though the outgroup included many innocent
children.
The military, with all of its internal pressure for conformity, including
adherence to a "can-do" spirit, is especially vulnerable to groupthink. The April
19 assault was planned by the military's Delta Force, and executed the FBI coun-
terpart to Delta Force, the HRT.129 The military during peacetime has an institu-
tional overeagemess to take on high-profile missions, while underestimating the
risks of failure. Quasi-military units, such as the HRT, likewise spend long peri-
ods sitting idle, and may be overeager to contribute their "solution" to a high-pro-
file problem, while underestimating the dangers of their involvement.
How can groupthink, and its resultant risky decisions, be minimized?
Three reforms would have been particularly relevant at Waco, and should be
implemented by decision-makers in crises. First, every group meeting should
have a designated devil's advocate, who will point out potential risks. Second,
special care should be taken so that no one agency or coalition of experts can
monopolize the flow of incoming information. Janet Reno, by allowing the FBI
to monopolize the information coming to her, made it almost inevitable that she
would eventually do what the FBI wanted. Finally, the virtues which make the
military such an effective international killing force-such as uniformity, obedi-
ence, and group cohesion-make it especially susceptible to groupthink. For this
reason, the military should have no participation in law enforcement; quasi-mili-
tary units such as the FBI's HRT and the BATF SRT should be thoroughly demil-
itarized, and should play, at most, a very subordinate role in law-enforcement
decision-making.
VI. DEMILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT
Although it might be hoped that the Ruby Ridge and Waco disasters
would prompt a cutback in federal military-style strike forces intended for use
against Americans, just the opposite has happened.
A. The Proliferation of Federal Paramilitary Units
The United States Marshals Service now has a 100-man Special
129. See Hearing, supra note 13, at 19 (testimony of Attorney General Janet Reno).
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Operations Group which is "ready to go anywhere in the world at a moment's
notice." The SOG is located at the William F. Degan Memorial Special
Operations Center in Louisiana, which is named after one of the men involved in
the senseless shootout at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, in which non-suspect fourteen-year-
old Sammy Weaver was shot in the back as he attempted to flee to his cabin.
Attorney General Reno has stated that one reason for the April 19 tank
and chemical warfare attack on Mount Carmel was that the FBI Hostage Rescue
Team was tired. So the HRT is now expanded to 91 men, although there is no indi-
cation that the Hostage Rescue Team's mission has been narrowed to rescuing
rather than holding hostages. The only reforms are that FBI Director Freeh
promises that before the HRT is deployed in nonemergency situations, he will
make the decision personally, and that negotiators and the HRT will henceforth be
placed under the same command.1"0
The proliferation of BATF squads whose names imply violence contin-
ues: Tactical Response Teams, High-Risk Warrant Teams, Forced Entry Teams,
Entry Control Teams, and Special Response Teams (SRTs). In fiscal years 1993
through 1995, the SRTs were used 523 times, carrying out a dynamic entry in
about half of the 157 SRT utilizations in 1995.131
BATF continues to recruit the SRTs, in the words of one ex-BATF agent,
"hand-picking these superhormone guys." ,32 As Jim Jorgenson, of the National
Association of Treasury Agents points out, this means that SRTs are composed of
people who may run 300 yards and shoot better than anyone else, but who lack
the maturity and judgment to think where they are running.33 Absolute discipline
and adherence to orders may be virtues in the military, but not in civilian law
enforcement. Perhaps if the three SRTs that were used in the Waco raid included
a larger share of older, slower, and wiser agents, someone would have spoken up
when the raid commanders yelled "He knows we're coming" and "Let's go."
Rank-and-file defiance of the order to launch a surprise attack with no element of
surprise would have saved the lives of the four BATF agents, and of the Branch
Davidians.
130. See David Johnston, FB.I. Chief Restricts Unit Criticized in Idaho Standoff, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 1995, at 9; Joint Hearings, supra note 3, part 2, at 509 (testimony of Larry
Potts); James L. Pate, Ask Us No Questions, We'll Tell You No Lies, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE,
Mar. 1996, at 45.
131. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-17, USE OF FORCE: ATF POLICY,
TRAINING AND REVIEW PROCESS ARE COMPARABLE TO DEA'S AND FBI'S 7 (1996).
132. Carol Vinzant, ATF-Troop, SPY, Mar. 1994, at 49.
133. Interview of Jim Jorgenson by David Kopel; see also Erik Larson, ATF Under Siege:
Demon Agency?, TIME, Jul. 24, 1995 (discussing criticism of the ATF and its SRTs).
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BATF has stepped up the training of its field commanders in military tac-
tics, under the supervision of the Army.' In 1994, the Army's Joint Task Force
Six oversaw BATF training in the use of Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles,
including the 25mm machine guns on the BFVs. This training was necessitated by
BATF planning to use BFVs in future operations such as Waco, to avoid govern-
ment casualties. 35
In 1994, BATF acquired three OV-10 light attack aircraft, a type of plane
used in the Gulf War and for counter-insurgency, which is commonly equipped
with rockets, although machine guns and chain guns can also be attached.
Twenty-two such planes had been acquired in 1993.36 None of the planes were
registered to BATF, but at least seven are registered to American Warbirds in
Maryland. No company named "American Warbirds" has never acquired a license
to do business in Maryland, and thus, to the extent that American Warbirds actu-
ally exists, its operations are a criminal misdemeanor.'37 Aircraft title records indi-
cate that American Warbirds acquired the planes from Mid-Air Salvage, a com-
pany with a New Jersey address, but which (like American War Birds) does not
exist in the Federal Aviation Administration database. Mid-Air acquired the
planes from the federal government's General Services Administration.'38 It is not
clear why the transfer of aircraft from the military to the BATF needed to be laun-
dered through two civilian corporations. 3 9
134 According to a memo written by BATF Director John Magaw:
ATF has contacted the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command regarding its
need for command post training.... This training would include Tactical
Operations Center (TOC) functions, stress/crisis management, and decision
making. ATF was notified in January 1994 that the Army Military Police is
developing a tactical commanders course and would provide this training to ATF
at no cost. This course would be mandatory for those SACs/ASACs [Special-
Agent-in-Charge, Assistant-Special-Agent-in-Charge] who are currently being
identified to serve as future "Incident Commanders" or "Tactical Coordinators"
of major operations.
Bob Lesmeister, Bad Influence: Corruption within the Ranks of BATF in AMERICAN
FIREARMS INDUSTRY, June 1995, at 73.
135. BATF Goes Mechanized, THE RESISTER, (Winter 1995) available at <hhtp://
www.accessone.com/-rivero/POLITICS/ARCHIVE /resister_3.html> (visited May 6, 1997).;
Lesmeister, supra note 134, at 73,107.
136. James L. Pate, ATF Watch: ATF's Shadow Air Force, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE, Sept.
1995, at 22.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. At least some of the planes were put through Service Life Extension Program
(SLEP), which upgraded the engines from 750 horsepower to 1,040 h.p., replaced all of the
electronics in the plane, put in the latest military cockpit electronics, and inserted the same
FLIRIvideo system as the Apache helicopter has (allowing surveillance of a target or object
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According to BATF Director John W. Magaw, the BATF's OV-10 aircraft
have their weapons removed. Mr. Magaw describes the OV- 10's capabilities as
"reconnaissance" and "command and control and insertion of troops." " He states
that the forward-looking infrared system on the OV-10, which can be used to
identify objects at night or under poor visibility conditions, will be used "to
enhance the safety of ATF special agents and other law enforcement officers
working to combat firearms trafficking and other violent street crime." "I In 1996,
Congress defunded the BATF air force.
Beginning in 1973, the FBI set off a national trend in law enforcement by
creating a SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) team. Now, every one of the
FBI's fifty-six field offices has its own SWAT team (the 400 FBI satellite offices
do not)."4 2 Abandoning former Director J. Edgar Hoover's principle that FBI
agents should be well-trained generalists, the new FBI SWAT units specialize in
confrontation, rather than investigation, even though investigation was, after all,
the very purpose of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Whereas Hoover's
agents wore suits, and typically had a background in law or accounting, SWAT
teams wear camouflage or black ninja clothing, and came from a military back-
ground.'43 They are trained killers, not trained investigators. In the early 1980s, an
FBI super-SWAT team was invented: the Hostage Rescue Team. ' 4 Like the SWAT
team, it received military training, carried military weapons, and was composed
mostly of former military personnel. But rather than rescuing hostages, the
Hostage Rescue Team has become notorious for two incidents in which it held
hostage people who only wanted to be left alone: at Ruby Ridge, and at Waco.
"The swashbucklers are in control," laments Iowa Senator Charles Grassley.'16
B. Direct Military Intervention
In addition to federal law enforcement agencies becoming more milita-
from two to three miles away). After the expensive SLEP reconditioning, the planes were
immediately decommissioned (in some cases before the SLEP process was completed), and
transferred to BATE Id
140. Id.
141. Letter from John W. Magaw, Director, BATF, to Rep. C.W. Bill Young (Sept. 5,
1995).
142. RONALD KESSLER, THE FBI: INSIDE THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY 282 (1993).
143. One SWAT team head observed, "Most of the agents who try out for SWAT are for-
mer police or people with military backgrounds.... Their psychological makeup is they like to
go out and do things." Id. at 154.
144. The creator was Oliver "Buck" Revell, who also started the FBI's air force. Id. at 159.
145. See Mark Levin, What Became of the FBI?, NAT. REV., Oct 9, 1995, at 18.
146. Sam Vincent Meddis, Survivalist Tells His Side of Idaho Raid, USA TODAY, Sept. 7,
1995, at A3.
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rized, the military itself has become increasingly involved in domestic law
enforcement. On any given day, more than five thousand troops conduct law
enforcement operations within the United States. 4 7 This figure does not include
the much larger number of National Guard troops involved in law enforcement
every day.
Like other military assets, the National Guard is something which many
state officials would like to use, but are reluctant to pay for. They know that their
constituents may want a "drug war" in the abstract, but they may not be willing
to pay higher taxes for it. In contrast to most state governments, the federal gov-
ernment has no balanced budget requirement, and thus can spend money on all
sorts of wish-list programs, without having to pay for them.
Federal deficit financing provides a major source of funding for use of the
National Guard in law enforcement. The huge federal subsidies provided by the
federal government to the state National Guards are what allows Guard units to
participate heavily in the drug war.
The National Guard has begun to lobby for even broader law enforcement
privileges. For example, in Rhode Island, the National Guard proposed that it be
allowed to share in profits from asset forfeiture operations.' 8
As illegal immigration has become an increasingly important political
issue, the United States Army and Marines have been deployed along the Mexican
border, to assist federal and local border patrol. These deployments have led to
strong protests from the Mexican government, for militarizing the border of a
nation with which the United States is at peace. 49
The Clinton administration is hard at work to remove the remaining
restrictions on use of the military in law enforcement. An administration terrorism
bill pushed by the President in 1995 defined all property offenses, and all violent
crimes more serious than an assault as "terrorism," and authorized the Army,
Navy, and Air Force to enforce "terrorism" laws.' s° A bill proposed by Senate
Majority Leader Robert Dole did the same thing.''
147. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civialian Control of the
U.S. Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 359 (1994) (citing Center for Defense
Information broadcast of Apr. 11, 1993). Even the National Park Service and the Department
of Health and Human Services now have their own SWAT teams.
148. R.I. Senate Bill No. 1096 (1995).
149. World Sitrep, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE, May 1996, at 16, 17.
150. See H.R. 896, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(b)(1) & (f) (1995).
151. See S. 735, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §102(b)(1) & (f) (1995).
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C. State and local militarization
The federal government actively works to militarize local law enforce-
ment. For example, Mark Lonsdale, the Director of the federal government's
Special Tactical Training Unit writes that there are various governmental pro-
grams, including those run by the federal Drug Enforcement Agency "available to
local law enforcement" for marijuana control. "The thrust of this training is
towards developing more of a military approach to tactics along with the study of
the methodology of the growers."''
The Navy SEALs and Army Rangers both conduct extensive training of
paramilitary units such as local police SWAT teams. The United States Marshals
Service and the Joint Task Forces (e.g., JTF-6, which helped provide military
training to BATF for the Waco raid) act as liaisons between the police departments
and the military trainers.' 3
One morning the residents of Cass Corridor (a poor neighborhood in
Detroit) were startled by the sounds of explosives and massive gunfire. While
many residents hid, the few who dared to look outside found an eighty-person
Detroit police department practice assault in progress on a vacant four-story
building in the neighborhood. The Deputy Police Chief in charge of the practice
assault explained that such drills are routinely performed by police agencies in
conjunction with the U.S. Army and other federal agencies.' In June 1996, two
hundred soldiers from Fort Bragg conducted urban warfare exercises in Pittsburgh
and McKeesport, Pennsylvania, in conjunction with the Pittsburgh and Allegheny
County SWAT teams. The noise from small explosives and the low-hovering heli-
copters (dropping troops practicing a nighttime invasion of an urban area) fright-
ened many civilians, who had no warning of what was happening. 5 (SWAT exer-
cises near the Mount Carmel Center in 1992 played a major role in convincing
Koresh that an attack was imminent, and in spurring Koresh's paranoia and arms
acquisition, although the exercises had nothing to do with him.) 56
The federal government's Advanced Research Projects Agency supervis-
152. MARK V. LONSDALE, RAIDS: A TACTICAL GUIDE TO HIGH RISK WARRANT
SERVICE 194 (L.A.: S.T.T.U., Training Division, 1991).
153. P.B. Kraska and V.E. Kappeler, The Rise and Normalization of U.S. Police
Paramilitary Units, SOCIAL PROBLEMS (1997).
154. Detroit Residents Alarmed by Backyard Police "Raids", GUN WEEK, Jan. 13, 1995,
at 2.
155. Michael A. Fuoco, Army War Games are Night Fright, PITTS. POST-GAZETTE, June
5, 1996, at Al, A16; Michael A. Fuoco, Military Retreats in Face of Anger, PITTS. POST-
GAZETTE, June 6, 1996, at B1, B6.
156. See, e.g., Interview with Henry Stanley McMahon, Jr., and Karen J. Kilpatrick at
National Rifle Association in Washington D.C. (May 25, 1993) (transcript on file with the
authors).
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es a Joint Program Steering Group for Operations Other than War/Law
Enforcement, which brings Defense Department and Justice Department officials
together in order to find civilian law enforcement applications for military tech-
nology.'"1 The United States Army Aviation & Troop Command (ATCOM) is sell-
ing surplus OH6-A helicopters to state and local governments for use in drug law
enforcement. Rep. Ed Royce (R-Calif.) has proposed that Congress give states the
cash with which to buy more helicopters from the Army. 58
As a result of both federal and local actions, America is moving towards
the normalization of paramilitary forces in law enforcement. For example, the
police in Fresno, California, have taken the next step towards militarization of
local law enforcement. The Fresno SWAT team, in full battle gear, now deploys a
full-time patrol unit in the city. Deeming the SWAT patrol an "unqualified suc-
cess," the Fresno police department "is encouraging other police agencies to fol-
low suit."'59 About twenty percent of police departments in cities over 50,000 have
already put their own paramilitary units into street police work. In many cases,
funding for street deployment of paramilitary units is funded by "community
policing" grants from the federal government. The majority of police departments
use their paramilitary units to serve "dynamic entry" search warrants. 60
SWAT teams also get deployed in missions very foreign to ordinary
police work:
The SWAT Team in Chapel Hill, NC conducted a large-scale crack
raid of an entire block in a predominantly African-American neigh-
borhood. The Raid, termed "Operation Redi-Rock," resulted in the
detention and search of up to 100 people, all of whom were Af-
rican-Americans. (Whites were allowed to leave the area.) No one
was ever prosecuted for a crime."'
D. The "Drug War"
The major cause of the militarization of American law enforcement has
been the "drug war." In 1981 and 1988, Congress created massive exceptions to
157. Police to Benefit from Defense Gadgetry, LAW ENF. NEWS, Nov. 30, 1994, at 9.
158. Crime Fighting Bargain: Army Surplus Helicopters, AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE
EXCHANGE COUNCIL, Feb. 23, 1995, at 5.
159. Kraska, supra note 81, at 417.
160. Kraska and Kappeler, supra note 153.
161. Kraska, supra note 81, at 418 (citing Barnett v. Karpinos 460 S.E.2nd 208, 209-10
(1995).
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the Posse Comitatus Act, to allow use of the armed services, including the
National Guard, in drug law enforcement. 2
Because of drug war exceptions created in the Posse Comitatus Act, every
region of the United States now has a Joint Task Force staff in charge of coordi-
nating military involvement in domestic law enforcement. In region six, the JTF's
Operational Support Planning Guide, in the edition current in 1993, enthused,
accurately, that "Innovative approaches to providing new and more effective sup-
port to law enforcement agencies are constantly sought, and legal and policy bar-
riers to the application of military capabilities are gradually being eliminated."
Consistent with the trend noted by the JTF, the 1995 session of Congress saw a
proposal to create a 2,500 member federal Rapid Deployment Force for the
Attorney General to deploy at her discretion to assist local law enforcement.163
The collapse of the Soviet Union has, unfortunately, led many military
officials to seek out a new enemy to justify continued funding. Often, that new
military enemy turns out to be American citizens. The North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD) admits that it is no longer capable of protecting
Americans from incoming nuclear missiles. Yet NORAD enjoys hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in annual funding, as part of a 1.8 billion dollar systems upgrade,
having convinced Congress to assign NORAD the mission of tracking planes and
ships that might be carrying drugs.16'
Many other federal military programs have hitched themselves to the
anti-drug bandwagon. For example, when President Clinton in April 1996
requested 250 million dollars in extra funding for anti-drug programs, over half
that money was earmarked for the military.
65
The results of such programs are evident not only at Waco, but in Puerto
Rico. There, the National Guard provides a large part of the manpower and the
heavy military equipment for police-Guard assaults on public housing apart-
ments.'
162. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-379 (1997).
163. See H.R. 97, 104th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1995).
164. Jim Malloy, These Days, NORAD Key Player in Drug War, DEN. POST, Apr. 23,
1996, at B4.
165. Specifically: $98 million to modify two Navy P-3B aircraft into "specialized radar
warning aircraft" which would be transferred to the U.S. Customs Service; $15 million to
install a TPS-70 ground-based radar system in an unspecified foreign country; $6 million for
"non-intrusive" inspection systems along the Mexican border; $3 million more for National
Guard marijuana eradication; and $10 million for "classified" Department of Defense drug
activities.
166. For a favorable view of these assaults, see Jerry D. Fitz, Taking Back the Projects,
POLICE, May 1996, at 56-61. At the end of the article, the following "Editor's Note," appears:
"Police does not necessarily endorse the methods used to enforce the 'Mano Dura' program.
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In 1987, the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General were ordered
to provide annual briefings to local law enforcement about available Department
of Defense assistance, to set up a special office to assist civilian law enforcement,
and even to provide a toll-free number for law enforcement inquiries.,67 In 1993,
Congress ordered the Department of Defense to sell military surplus to state and
local law enforcement for use in counter-drug activities.'68
Many "Patriot" organizations are comprised of members who are have
been terrified by the appearance of unmarked black helicopters over nearby rural
property. These helicopters (which are actually a very dark green) have played a
major role in intensifying fear of the federal government. The helicopters are not
from the United Nations, but are part of the National Guard's marijuana eradica-
tion program. They are flying over rural property as a result of 1981 and 1989
Congressional amendments which created a partial drug exception to the Posse
Comitatus Act. In conjunction with the Supreme Court decision in Oliver v.
United States,'69 which allows law enforcement officials to trespass on "open
fields" without probable cause or a search warrant-even when the owner has
taken all possible steps to exclude trespassers-many rural areas are subjected to
low-level overflights and landings of dark helicopters carrying men in military
uniforms with automatic weapons. Who would not be frightened by the sudden
invasion of an unmarked helicopter and men with machine guns on private property?
Every fall, Humboldt County, California, is invaded by National Guard
forces, as part of the Campaign Against Marijuana Production (CAMP). In a typ-
ical year, 100 harassment complaints are logged against airborne and ground
activities of CAMP personnel.'7
Tanks, helicopters, and men pointing automatic rifles at children have no
place in a free society. Neither the push to make America a drug-free society nor
desire to "do something" about terrorism should be accomplished at the expense
of losing our freedom.
We are merely reporting on the logistics of the take-overs." Id. at 61. It is very rare for Police
to attach editorial disclaimers to its articles.
167. See 10 U.S.C. § 380 (1994).
168. See 10 U.S.C. § 381 (1994).
169. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
170. Trouble in the Fields: Residents Fed up with Anti-Marijuana Drive, LAW ENF. NEWS,
Oct. 31, 1994, at 5. Use of the National Guard for marijuana eradication is typically preceded
by a declaration from the Governor that marijuana cultivation represents an "emergency"
which necessitates the use of the Guard. While most persons think of an "emergency" as a
spontaneous and unexpected event (such as a flood), the Orwellian military use of "emer-
gency" means "something that the Governor thinks is a serious problem, even if the problem
has persisted at endemic levels for many years." Micheal Dorgan, California Loses War on
Weed, DEN. POST, Nov. 19, 1995, at A30.
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The incentives for lawless violence and militarization do not come entire-
ly from law enforcement itself. As sociologist Phillip Jenkins observes, "Media
images can also frame the expectation and behavior of individual agents and
administrators..... ' '7 Sensationalistic "reality television" shows which glorify vio-
lent, illegal police conduct play a role in legitimating violence in the mind of law
enforcement officers who watch such programs' m -movies such as Dirty Harry,
Lethal Weapon, and many others. 1
73
Another cause is the use of military rhetoric by politicians. Political talk
about a "war on drugs" or a "war on crime" confuses the objectives and methods
of war (destroying a foreign military force, and not worrying about proper proce-
dure) with law enforcement in a free society, involving suspects who are
American citizens, and entitled to the full protection of the Bill of Rights. As New
York University law professor Paul Chevigny explains:
Armies are organized and trained for killing an enemy, usually
more or less well-defined, and not for service and law-enfor-
cement among a civilian population to which they themselves be-
long, in situations for which they have to make fine-grained legal
and social distinctions about what action is required....
[T]he results of ["war on crime" rhetoric] distort and poison police
relations with citizens. The police think of themselves as an occ-
upying army, and the public comes to think the same. The police
lose the connection with the public which is a principal advantage
to local policing, and their job becomes progressively more diff-
icult, while they become more unpopular.1 14
One can be in favor of drugs being illegal, and still oppose "the war on
drugs," just as one can want food stamp fraud to be illegal without wanting a "war
on welfare cheaters," because to have "a war" is to make it likely that the military
will become involved. As Police Studies professor Peter B. Kraska writes:
[T]he militaristic nature of the discourse on crime and drug
171. PHILIP JENKINS, USING MURDER: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SERIAL
HOMICIDE 233 (1994).
172. The very first episode of the supposedly realistic N.KYP.D. Blue involved the police
protagonist publicly beating up a man he believed to have been guilty of a crime for which he
had just been acquitted by a jury of his peers, with only minimal sanction threatened against
the officer.
173. While the effects of violent television on children have received a great deal of atten-
tion, the effects of violent entertainment on adults, including adults in law enforcement, have
rarely been analyzed.
174. PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS 124
(1995).
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control - wars on crime and wars on drugs - constitutes more than
ineffectual media/political rhetoric. Filtering solutions to the
complex social problems of crime and substance abuse through the
"war" metaphor helps to structure our values in use, our theories,
and most important, our actions .... A metaphor and associated
dis-course materialized, for example, into urban police depart-
ments deploying paramilitary police groups to patrol U.S. neighbor-
hoods.' 7"
Regarding the First World War, Randolph Bourne observed that war is the
health of the state. The drug war has been the health of the military state, and may
in the long run be the death of the Constitution.
E. Suggestions for Reform
The military operates on the principle of authoritarian control, with no
room for dissent, for waiting for a consensus to form, or for democracy. Most
members of the armed forces live in enclaves separate from the rest of society-
enclaves that are orderly and authoritarian, often quite different from the chaotic
civilian world.'76 The military lifestyle and military housing enclaves are ill fitted
to building the values of due process, democracy, and diversity on which civilian
law enforcement must be founded.
Reforms to reduce the trend to militarization of domestic law enforce-
ment should include tightening the Posse Comitatus Act so that it proscribes all
use of military personnel and equipment, not just use of the Army and Air Force,
and not just unreimbursed use." (Currently exempt from Posse Comitatus, the
Navy's SEAL Team Six has allegedly participated in several "take-downs" of
crack houses in the Los Angeles area.)' In particular, Congress should eliminate
175. Kraska, supra note 81, at 420. Of course the United States had a "war on poverty"
in the 1960s without sending in the Army. But the "war on poverty" rhetoric, along with
President Carter's assertion that energy crisis was "the moral equivalent of war," helped pave
the way for "war on crime" and "war on drugs" rhetoric, rhetoric that has led to military inter-
vention
176. Dunlap, supra note 147, at 388.
177. Contrast United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (interpreting
statutory language literally, so that Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to the Navy) with 32
C.F.R. § 213.10(c) (Department of Defense regulation applying Posse Comitatus Act to the
Navy and Marine Corps, while allowing Secretary of the Navy to make exceptions on a case-
by-case basis). The Act does not currently apply to the Coast Guard, which in peacetime is con-
sidered part of the Department of Transportation. See 14 U.S.C. § 1 (1997).
178. Total Hogwash, THE RESISTER, (Winter 1995) <http://www.accessone.com/-rivero/
POLITICS/ARCHIVE/resister_3.html> (visted May 6, 1997). See also John P. Coffey, Note,
The Navy's Role in Interdicting Narcotics Traffic: War on Drugs or Ambush on the
Constitution, 75 GEO. L. REV. 1947 (1987) (criticizing loophole that allows use of navy ships
firing artillery in drug law enforcement, under pretext of having the ship fly Coast Guard col-
ors when it begins aggressive activities).
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the loophole that exempts the National Guard from the Act."
Congress should also repeal the drug exceptions and other exceptions to
the Posse Comitatus Act, expressly making the only exceptions those involved
with law-enforcement in international waters or requiring unique military exper-
tise related to nuclear weapons."I°
Several reforms could be made to deter abuses of the Posse Comitatus
Act. For example, knowingly violating the Posse Comitatus Act should be a pred-
icate felony for felony murder. In addition, federal courts should not allow evi-
dence obtained in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act to be admitted in court.
Congress could also create a civil cause of action for persons injured by Posse
Comitatus Act violations.
In the years before the Posse Comitatus Act, any soldier who did engage
in police activity was deemed to be acting as a private citizen, rather than as a sol-
dier. Under this Mansfield Doctrine, the individual, since he was not acting as a
soldier, could be personally sued or criminally prosecuted for any wrongs he com-
mitted. Courts should revive the Mansfield Doctrine at once, and allow injured
victims to bring lawsuits against individual "law enforcement" soldiers who per-
petrate civil torts.
Congress should repeal 10 U.S.C. § 372, which authorizes the Secretary
of Defense to make "any" Department of Defense equipment available to "any
Federal, State, or local civilian law enforcement personnel for law enforcement
purposes." Like previous steps to militarize domestic law enforcement, this pro-
vision grew out of the "drug war," in this case the omnibus 1988 drug law, but the
language does not restrict the military equipment to drug enforcement purposes.
Even in the case of drug law enforcement, military equipment-such as
tanks-has no legitimate role in civilian law enforcement. The type of equipment
which is used to attack hostile nations is not the type of equipment which should
179. While the Guard is almost entirely funded by the federal government, it is exempt
from Posse Comitatus when it is in "state status," under the immediate command of state offi-
cials, as opposed to "federal status," when the Guard is commanded by federal officers.
180. Besides the drug exceptions, there are various Posse Comitatus exceptions for mat-
ters which are well within the competence for civilian federal, state, and local law enforce-
ment: civil disorders (10 U.S.C. §§ 331-36) (1997); protection of federal parks (16 U.S.C. §§
23, 78) (1997); protection of foreign officials and other foreign guests (18 U.S.C. §§ 112(0,
116) (1997); crimes against members of Congress (18 U.S.C. § 351) (1997); crimes against the
President (18 U.S.C. §§ 1751, 3056) (1997); neutrality laws (22 U.S.C. §§ 408, 461-62)
(1997); threats to federal property (42 U.S.C. § 1885) (1997); execution of certain civil rights
warrants (42 U.S.C. § 1989) (1997); broadly defined "disasters" (42 U.S.C. §§ 4401-84)
(1997); removing unlawful fences from public lands (43 U.S.C. §1065) (1997); and customs
laws (50 U.S.C. § 220) (1997). We are not suggesting that the substantive laws in question be
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be used against Americans, even Americans who are suspected of violating the
law.
Of course, any person who has served honorably in the military should be
allowed to apply for any civilian job, including law enforcement. But the federal
government should not use subsidies to bias police departments into hiring per-
sons with a military background, as opposed to a civilian background. Much of
the training which makes a good soldier is contradictory to the training necessary
to be a peace officer.
Congress should also repeal the new statute allowing weapons of war to
be given away free to federal, state, and local police."' A 1968 law had allowed
the military to sell, "at fair market value," surplus firearms and ammunition to
local law enforcement agencies.'
Congress should require that all international warfare treaties signed by
the United States be binding on domestic operations of the federal government. If
the United States is willing to agree not to use certain particular deadly types of
chemical or biological weapons against foreign troops, the U.S. government
should also be willing to foreswear use of those same weapons against American
citizens.
Various federal statutes authorize different federal agencies to allow their
employees to carry firearms. Certainly there are many federal employees with a
legitimate need to carry firearms. Sensibly, the statute authorizing Forest Service
employees to carry firearms states that no more than one thousand employees
shall be so authorized.' This sensible cap should be extended to all other agen-
cies with gun-carrying employees, with a view to reducing gun-toting by federal
employees only to cases of genuine need. The right to keep and bear arms, after
all, is for "the People," not the government.
To the extent that non-discriminatory state laws authorize ordinary per-
sons to obtain firearms carry permits and to carry firearms while at work, there is
nothing wrong with federal employees within that state obtaining such permits for
themselves. But cases of federal employees carrying firearms in contravention of
relevant state law, as if the federal employees were some kind of superior class,
should be kept to an absolute minimum.
Law enforcement use of masks in the service of search or arrest warrants
should be prohibited, except when specifically authorized by a court when autho-
repealed. Rather, these laws should be enforced by civilian law enforcement.
181. See 10 U.S.C. 371-79 (1997).
182. See 10 U.S.C. 371-79 (1994).
183. 16 U.S.C. 559(c) (1997).
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rizing the warrant, based on compelling need. Masks not only make peace offi-
cers look inappropriately terrifying, they prevent identification of rogue officers
so that they cannot be sued later for criminal acts.
As an important symbolic step, federal law enforcement should give up
its black or near-black uniforms and replace them with a color (such as ordinary
blue) more consistent with law enforcement in a democracy.' Rutgers University
professor Michael Solomon, a scholar of the psychology of clothing, explains that
black law enforcement uniforms tap "into associations between the color black
and authority, invincibility, the power to violate laws with impunity.",85
VII. CONCLUSION
Soldiers are not peace officers. At all levels of policing, it is time that
police officers be restored to their honored status as peace officers. Police ethicist
John Kleinig notes: "Were police to see themselves primarily as social peace-
keepers, they would be less inclined to 'overkill' in their dealings with both ordi-
nary citizens and those whose disruptive activities properly require their inter-
vention."'86 To help prevent future Wacos, and the needless loss of life of law
enforcement personnel and other persons, law enforcement in the United States
should be demilitarized. Cicero's advice to the Roman republic, "Let the soldier
give way to the civilian,"'87 must be heeded by those who are intent on preserving
the American republic, and the rule of civil law.
184. The BATF's outfits, including their Ninja clothes, are actually blue, but the color is
so dark that the clothes are usually described as black. Moorman Oliver, Jr., Killed by
Semantics: Or Was it a Keystone Kop Kaleidoscope Kaper?, in FROM THE ASHES: MAKING
SENSE OF WACO 71, 75 (James R. Lewis ed., 1994).
185. William F. Powers, Dressed to Kill?, WASH. POST, May 4, 1995.
186. JOHN KLEINIG, THE ETHICS OF POLICING 102 (1996).
187. "Cedant arma togae." Marcus Tullius Cicero, Orationes Philippicae (ca. 60 B.C.).
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